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INTRODUCTION
In Shelby County v. Holder,1 the Supreme Court deemed section 4 of the Voting Rights Act’s
unconstitutional. Section 4 defines which states and jurisdictions were subject to the VRA’s
preclearance structure. Pursuant to §§4 and 5 of the Act, some states and jurisdictions were
required to have any voting change they made precleared by the Department of Justice or a threejudge panel of the District Court of the District of Columbia before those voting changes could
go into effect.2 Other states and jurisdictions could enact voting changes that, like most normal
legislation, would become effective upon passage. All voting changes from all jurisdictions,
whether required to be precleared or not, are subject to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The
Shelby County Court determined that section 4 is unconstitutional because §4 supposedly
targeted specific states and jurisdictions and placed specific burdens on those states and
jurisdictions. The Court’s decision rested on the argument that a doctrine of equal sovereignty
undergirds our federalism principles. That doctrine requires that states enjoy equal sovereignty
and, therefore, should be treated the same under federal law. Consequently, any law that, in
application, treats some states differently than others invades the sovereignty of the states that
are more heavily burdened than other states. Unless the law addresses an extraordinary and
current problem, the law is unconstitutional. Though such burdens stemming from the Act’s
preclearance structure may have been constitutional at one time, the Court determined that voting
conditions in covered jurisdictions have improved so much that the burden of preclearance for
those jurisdictions can no longer be justified. The effectiveness of the VRA in lessening the
incidence of race-based voting discrimination and the passage of time have made the problem of
such discrimination in the covered jurisdictions so much less troublesome that the Court thought
that § 4 stood as an unnecessary and unconstitutional affront to the equal sovereignty of the
covered jurisdictions.
The Shelby County Court’s approach may appear simple and reasonable. However, it lacks
context that should be considered when deciding voting rights cases and interpreting voting
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rights statutes. A focus on state sovereignty or state’s rights might be appropriate in a typical
non-voting rights case. However, the preclearance structure embedded in the VRA was designed
to address voting changes in states with histories of seeking to evade the 15th Amendment’s
command that the right to vote be provided to citizens without regard to race. Pointing to the
equal sovereignty of such states as a justification for requiring that those states be treated no
differently than states that may not have nearly as bad a history of attempting to evade the 15th
Amendment’s requirement is dubious.
The court misapprehends the nature of VRA preclearance. The Shelby County Court appears to
view the preclearance structure as a standard law that, like section 2 of the VRA, provides
substantive law and legal rules. However, the preclearance structure is a tool to enforce the
VRA’s underlying law. Consequently, it is more akin to a legislative injunction. Rather than
treat states as sovereign entities whose sovereignty can only be infringed is specific narrow
circumstances, the Shelby County Court should have treated states subject to preclearance as
parties to an injunction. In that context, whether a state enjoys equal sovereignty as its sister
states is irrelevant. The key questions are whether the covered jurisdictions ever should have
been subject to the legislative injunction and under what circumstances should a court determine
that the legislative injunction should be dissolved.
This brief ticket addresses a few of the underlying issues.

I.

Shelby County v. Holder

In Shelby County, the Court reviewed the Voting Rights Act and found §4 of the Act to be
wanting. The Court conceded that the VRA is a broad and majestic law passed pursuant to the
15th Amendment to deal with the scourge of race-based discrimination in voting.3 However, the
Court noted that the VRA provided strong remedies to address the problem. Fortunately, the
Act’s remedies had helped to reduce the incidence of race-based voting discrimination
significantly.4 Consequently, the time had come to evaluate whether some of the VRA’s
remedies should be withdrawn in light of the success of the VRA and the changed conditions that
exist in the wake of VRA enforcement.5 The core of the VRA – §2, with its broad nationwide
bar on race-based voting discrimination – was not at issue and remains intact.6 However, the
VRA’s most intrusive part – the preclearance structure – had to be reviewed.
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The Court addressed two parts of the preclearance structure. The Court reviewed §4 of the Act,
which defines the states and jurisdictions that are subject to preclearance, the covered
jurisdictions. It also reviewed §5 of the Act, which requires that covered jurisdictions have their
voting changes approved by the federal government before those changes become effective. The
Court did not rule on §5;7 it invalidated §4.8
The Court viewed the preclearance structure as an affront to federalism principles.9 According
to the Court, our system of federalism treats all states as co-equal sovereign entities.10 By
forcing some states to have their laws precleared while allowing the laws of other states to
become effective without review, the preclearance structure tore at the fabric of federalism.11
The preclearance structure’s harm to federalism principles could be tolerated if justified.
However, the justification for such harm had to be strong. The Court noted that current burdens
can only be justified by current conditions.12 Consequently, if current conditions were not
extraordinary, extraordinary current burdens could not be justified.13
The Court reviewed the progress regarding voting rights that had been made since the VRA was
passed in 1965 and found that current conditions could not justify current burdens. Conditions
could justify the burdens when the preclearance structure was first reviewed and found
constitutional in 1966. Though the preclearance structure was originally to be in effect only for
five years, Congress has always renewed the structure as it approached its sunset. Following
renewals in 1970, 1975 and 1982, the constitutionality of the preclearance structure was
continually affirmed. The structure was last reauthorized in 2006 to extend through 2031. The
Shelby County Court essentially reviewed the 2006 reauthorization. The Court criticized
Congress for using a coverage formula that appeared to rely on decades-old data to support the
singling out of covered jurisdictions to be subject to preclearance.14 In the face of what the Court
viewed as weak evidence of a justification to treat some states differently than others, it
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invalidated §4 – the coverage formula. However, it did not invalidate the preclearance structure.
Section 5 – the preclearance requirement – survived for another day. Indeed, the Court noted
that Congress could pass a new and legitimate §4 that might be upheld, thus reconstituting the
entire preclearance structure.15
The Shelby County Court’s language was clear. The VRA survives and Congress can provide
broad remedies to effectuate the VRA’s purpose. However, the doctrine of equal sovereignty
limits state-specific remedies to those that can be justified by extraordinary circumstances.
Unfortunately, the Court was not clear regarding the evidence that would be sufficient to prove
that such extraordinary circumstances exist. Indeed, whether the Court believes that such
evidence exists is unclear.

II.

The Flawed Equal Sovereignty Argument

The Shelby County Court invalidated §4 of VRA in significant part because it believed that §4
violated a doctrine of equal sovereignly found in the Constitution. The Court’s argument is
flawed. There is little reason to believe that an equal sovereignty doctrine that may or may not
be embedded in the Constitution should be operationalized, as the Shelby County Court suggests,
to stop a preclearance structure that requires that some jurisdictions get their voting changes
approved before those changes are effective. Indeed, operationalizing that doctrine to invalidate
a law that was designed to minimize the effects of race-based voting discrimination is
particularly ironic.
A doctrine of equal sovereignty may be embedded in the Constitution. However, the Supreme
Court has, in the past, rejected its application in the voting rights context. In South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,16 the case in which the Supreme Court first ruled that the VRA’s preclearance
provisions were constitutional, the Court addressed South Carolina’s claim that the doctrine of
equal sovereignty invalidated the VRA’s preclearance structure. 17 The Katzenbach Court
rejected South Carolina’s argument, ruling that the doctrine of equal sovereignty applies only at
the time states are admitted to the Union. 18 However, even if one believes the Katzenbach erred
regarding the general reach of the doctrine of equal sovereignty, Katzenbach rejected the
doctrine’s reach in the context of addressing race-based voting discrimination. Of course, the
argument has been reintroduced and accepted by the current Court in the wake of Katzenbach.19
However, even if Katzenbach is incorrect and the doctrine of equal sovereignty should affect the
interpretation of the Act, §4 arguably does not offend the doctrine. Section 4 is a generally
applicable statute that applies to all jurisdictions. It merely covers jurisdictions that meet two
specific voting-related criteria.20 The Shelby County Court argued that, in application, §4 singles
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out states for coverage.21 Katzenbach arguably suggests the same.22 Those conclusions rest on
the belief that §4’s criteria were chosen to cover specific states. However, even if the criteria
were chosen to capture those jurisdictions, those states and jurisdictions were selected using
voting-related criteria that suggest that those states should have been selected for the scrutiny
that the preclearance structure provides.23 The covered jurisdictions were covered under §4 only
after they were shown to be different enough from other jurisdictions with respect to
discrimination in providing voting rights based on race to warrant coverage. That made them
subject to preclearance, the structure Congress used to help guarantee equal voting rights on the
basis of race in particular jurisdictions. Congress did not select random criteria, e.g., all states
whose name begin with the letter C, to create the covered jurisdictions subject to preclearance. It
chose criteria set to capture offenders who had repeatedly violated the spirit if not the letter of
the 15th Amendment. There is little inherently wrong with treating covered jurisdictions
differently than others based on past actions or past conditions. Consequently, even if Section 4
singles out states for coverage, it does not do so in a way that necessarily implicates the doctrine
of equal sovereignty.
The use of the doctrine of equal sovereignty to invalidate a preclearance structure designed to
enforce voting rights is deeply ironic. The history of voting rights is a long one of attempts by
some states and jurisdictions to deny the right to vote to citizens, often because of the race of
those citizens. Given that not all jurisdictions share the same history with respect to the denial of
voting rights, differential treatment of jurisdictions – based on their history of voting rights
violations – is reasonable. An attempt to remedy that problem as thoroughly as possible may
encourage differential treatment that might appear to implicate principles of equal sovereignty.
However, that should not make the differential treatment unconstitutional.
The rights of the voters should matter as well. In providing voting rights, states are supposed to
protect the voter’s individual and collective right to vote. Consequently, states that have refused
to provide equal voting rights should be treated as recalcitrant parties, not as sovereign states that
must be provided the latitude to structure and change their voting processes in any way they see
fit. Simply, those jurisdictions should be treated as entities that have or likely will deny voting
rights to others.24 In that context, §§4 and 5 look less like an attack on equal sovereignty and
more like an attempt to make sure that the voting rights of the citizenry are protected
prospectively. Indeed, in that context, complaints from covered jurisdictions regarding equal
sovereignty – to be operationalized as the right to pass laws that might violate the rights of
citizens to vote on the basis of race subject only to retrospective, but not prospective scrutiny –
are almost nonsensical. At least, in the context of voting rights, the state’s sovereignty should be
balanced against the people’s sovereignty and right to be heard through the political process.
Preferably, the nature of voting rights – fundamental rights preservative of all others – is such
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that the rights of voters ought to trump any right to equal sovereignty that a state can claim in the
context where past violations of voting rights has triggered the preclearance structure. Simply,
the doctrine of equal sovereignty should carry little, if any weight, in the context of VRA
enforcement.
If the Shelby County Court had viewed covered jurisdictions less as states and more as litigants
or potential violators of constitutional rights, it could have seen preclearance for what it is.
Preclearance is a structure aimed at protecting citizens of jurisdictions from having their rights
violated by an entity that has done so in the past. Preclearance is better thought of as a
legislative injunction than as a pure law.

III.

Preclearance as a Legislative Injunction

The Shelby County Court treated the preclearance structure as a typical law that intentionally
imposed on certain states the burden of having their laws reviewed by the federal government
before the laws could become effective. However, that approach to preclearance is somewhat
narrow and misguided. That outlook focuses directly on §4’s coverage formula and tangentially
on §5’s enforcement scheme. However, an appreciation of the full preclearance structure would
have allowed the Court to conceive of the preclearance structure as a legislative injunction, a
somewhat less dramatic remedy for the serious concern at hand. A brief explanation of the
broader preclearance structure is necessary.
The preclearance structure has four essential parts: the coverage formula, preclearance
enforcement, bail-out and bail-in. As noted above, §4 – the coverage formula – defines the
jurisdictions that are to be required to seek preclearance for their voting changes. Section 5
requires that the covered jurisdiction submit their voting changes for preclearance by the
Attorney General or a three-judge panel of the District Court of the District of Columbia. The
bail-out provision is in §4(a) of the Act. It allows a jurisdiction to exit coverage and the
preclearance regime if it can meet a certain list of criteria, including that it be free of voting
rights violations for a number of years. Though some have argued that bailing out of the Act is
nearly impossible, jurisdictions began bailing out of the Act in 1967 and continued to do so up
until §4 was deemed unconstitutional. 25 Once a jurisdiction has bailed out, it is under the
jurisdiction of a federal court for ten years. Conversely, §3(c) of the Act allows the Department
of Justice to bail-in jurisdictions that have engaged in intentional discrimination with respect to
voting rights.26 Those jurisdictions then must have their voting changes precleared as if they
were covered by §4.
When all of the parts of the preclearance regime are considered, the structure appears to be an
attempt to make sure that jurisdictions that have engaged in unlawful conduct will be subject to
having voting changes – the rules that they have used in the past to break the law – reviewed
before those voting changes become effective. A jurisdiction that has shown that can be trusted
over time to behave in a constitutional appropriate manner can exit preclearance. Conversely, a
jurisdiction that had not been covered can, through unconstitutional conduct, enter the
25
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preclearance regime. The structure was built to make sure that jurisdictions that the federal
government has reason to believe may issue discriminatory voting changes may be stopped from
having those changes go into effect until a quick review of the changes occurred. The parts of
the preclearance structure interact to allow those jurisdictions that need not be subject to
preclearance to avoid it and to allow those jurisdictions that need to be subject to preclearance to
be subject to it. The structure may look extraordinary because it is being imposed by a
legislature. However, the substance of the structure is not particularly extraordinary. Indeed, it
is not substantially different than injunctions against states or municipalities for other
constitutional violations.
Preclearance is a structure for attempting to make sure that the voting rights laws are followed.
It was not meant to provide a different or more onerous legal standard for the covered
jurisdiction to meet. Since 1966, the courts and more recently Congress have built up a
jurisprudence of §5 that differs from the jurisprudent of §2 – the broad voting rights legal
standard that applies nationwide.27 Consequently, it cannot be said that the standard for
preclearance resembles the standard for avoiding §2 liability. Nonetheless, as originally drafted
§§2 and 5 could have been read as encompassing the same substantive standard.
Looking at preclearance as a legislative injunction has a number of benefits. The structure of
injunction fits fairly well with the structure of preclearance. Preclearance encourages the
jurisdiction to follow the law prospectively rather than enjoining the enforcement of a law
retrospectively. By stopping a voting change from becoming effective until it is precleared,
preclearance effectively serves as a preliminary preemptive injunction. In addition, treating
preclearance like an injunction would avoid the discussion of equal sovereignty that arguably
sidetracked the Shelby County Court. Jurisdictions would be treated merely as litigants or
parties. Lastly, the courts and commentators might stop discussing how onerous preclearance is.
Many jurisdictions are subject to injunctions, consent decrees and the like. Certainly, those
jurisdictions would rather not be subject to an injunction or other court supervision. However,
those jurisdictions also realize that an injunction is not an impossible burden.

IV.

Addressing a Preclearance as Legislative Injunction

Treating preclearance as a legislative injunction is convenient, but does not fully resolve the
problem. If the Shelby County Court had viewed preclearance as a legislative injunction, it
would still have had to consider how to approach and analyze Shelby County’s request to
dissolve. The Court’s conclusion may or may not have been the same. However, the Court
almost certainly would have approached the preclearance structure differently than it did. For
example, the Court could have disposed of the equal sovereignty question quickly. When
jurisdictions are subject to legal process, the issue is not whether the jurisdiction can be singled
out for poor treatment. Rather, it is whether the jurisdiction deserves whatever treatment it gets.
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Simply, the equal sovereignty question goes away. Nonetheless, there are a number of issues
that the Court would have to engage.
For example, there are a few questions about legislative power that the Court would need
address. The Court would need to address whether Congress had the authority to create a
legislative injunction scheme. That question could be answered fairly quickly. The Katzenbach
Court and Shelby County Court arguably already answered this question. The Katzenbach Court
referenced the 15th Amendment as providing Congress the authority to create the preclearance
structure, that is, the legislative injunction.28 The Shelby County Court did not invalidate
preclearance, it merely suggested that preclearance should be limited to extraordinary times.29
However, even if a legislative injunction is a legitimate tool to use, that does not say who should
be able to dissolve it. Congress might argue that it created the preclearance/legislative injunction
structure, so Congress alone should be able to dissolve the structure either by refusing to
reauthorize preclearance in 2031 or by affirmatively repealing the structure. Congress might also
argue that it should be allowed to continue preclearance in its sole discretion because of its right
to pass enforcement legislation under the 15th Amendment. Conversely, the Court might argue
that even though Congress could create the legislative injunction, injunctions and other remedies
are judicial in nature. Consequently, the Court should have some say in whether the
preclearance/judicial injunction structure can continue.
Assuming that the Court decided explicitly that preclearance as an injunction could continue, it
must determine if Congress or the Court should be tasked with determining whether Shelby
County should be able to exit preclearance. Congress could reasonably argue that it has already
provided bailout as the only way to exit preclearance. Conversely, the Court could argue that it
should be able to resolve legislative injunction cases the same way it would resolve other
injunction cases, based on prudential grounds. The problem with the Court taking that path is
that if the Court’s grounds for dissolving the injunction with respect to Shelby County do not
match with the bailout provisions that Congress already has in place, the Court is simply
overriding Congress based purely on power. That clash of power is the problem that the Shelby
County Court avoided by leaning so heavily on the equal sovereignty doctrine.
Though the questions in the last few paragraphs do not make it seem so, treating preclearance as
a legislative injunction clarifies a few issues. First, it removes the equal sovereignty issue from
the equation. Second, it forces the Court to consider whether Congress has the power under the
15th Amendment to create a legislative injunction. Third, it forces the Court consider whether
Congress’ only avenue for dissolving the legislative injunction – bailout – will be the only
avenue for a jurisdiction to dissolve the legislative injunction. Last, it forces the Court to
consider, without the cover of the equal sovereignty argument, whether it is willing to use raw
power to override a remedial scheme that Congress almost certainly had the authority to create.
Put slightly differently, Shelby County has been a covered jurisdiction under §4 for years and has
never been able to bail out. Should Congress have sole control over whether Shelby County can
exit the preclearance scheme or should the Court? The Court did not have to wrestle with that
question when it focused on the equal sovereignty issue.
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CONCLUSION
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court invalidated §4 of the Voting Rights Act because
it viewed §4 – the formula used to determine which jurisdictions would be subject to the Act’s
preclearance provision – to be an inappropriate invasion of state sovereignty or state’s rights.
Section 5 of the Act – the preclearance provision – requires that jurisdictions covered by §4 have
their voting changes approved by the federal government before taking effect. Such an invasion
of sovereignty through §§4 and 5 had to be justified as necessary to address extraordinary current
conditions, which the Court found not to exist. The Court’s approach was unsurprising given
that it had foreshadowed the approach in earlier cases. However, had the Court treated the
preclearance scheme as the equivalent of a legislative injunction against the jurisdictions covered
under section 4, it would have reached a more reasoned conclusion that more squarely addressed
the subtext of the opinion – the proper scope of congressional authority under the 15th
Amendment. Rather than address whether Congress should continue to make some states
preclear voting changes – an equal protection-style argument – the Court should have focused
more directly on whether Congress has authority under section 5 to make any state preclear
voting changes – a due process-style argument. Of course, had it done so and had it followed
prior precedent, it would likely have had to deem the preclearance process, with its coverage
formula embedded in §4, constitutional.
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